

# **Stakeholder Comments on the Information Disclosure Procedures**

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<b>Question 1</b>	<u><b>Should certain participants be exempt from the IDP? For example, should the capacity threshold be set at 40 MW or some other amount?</b></u>
<b>AltaGas</b>	PPA buyers should be exempt from the IDP requirements because PPA Buyers are not aware of any planned or unplanned outages before the PPA Owner (or generator owner) informs them of the situation, which is usually via e-mail. The threshold of 40 MW in OPP 601 is appropriate as any assets (generator or load) smaller than this amount will not have a material effect on pool prices.
<b>TransCanada</b>	The capacity threshold should set at 20 MW. Setting the threshold at this level will determine which participants will be exempted.
<b>Enmax</b>	On February 18, 2004, the MSA established a Trading Practices Guideline that requires market participants not to trade on the basis of known but not yet public information about the status of supply, load or transmission assets that can reasonably be expected to have a material impact on market price (referred to hereinafter as the “new TPG”). To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, ENMAX submits that all parties should be subject to the same rules. It should be noted that knowledge of the status of a 40 MW asset may be significant at various times. Additionally, any arbitrary lower bound threshold may confer an unfair information advantage to parties that may control multiple smaller units.
<b>Dow Chemical</b>	At times the market can be extremely sensitive to very small volumes. If a threshold is used, then it should include all of the capacity that the participant has under the limit; however, it is recognized that initially reporting totalized outages of less than 10 or 20 MW’s may be more trouble than worth; a phasing in of the smaller volumes can be planned for a later date.

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<p><b>Question 2</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p><b>Enmax</b></p> <p><b>TransAlta</b></p> <p><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p><u><i>What other parties, if any, should be covered by the IDP? For example, should inter-tie capacity, transmission facility owners, and importers and exporters be covered by the guideline?</i></u></p> <p>Yes, intertie owners or their affiliates or agents should also be affected by both the IDP and TPG.</p> <p>The IDP should also specifically cover inter-tie capacity and load participants.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, any physical system asset that would confer a trading advantage to a market participant that had preferential knowledge of its availability should be covered. As such, assets such as inter-ties and/or other transmission facilities that would reasonably have the potential to affect the ability of specific entities to participate in the wholesale market should be covered by the policy.</p> <p>The interim IDP arbitrarily excludes load and transmission from outage reporting which is again choosing winners and losers. The IDP should be implemented and apply to all parties. If the MSA is unilaterally amending the AESO Outage Scheduling Policy then all parties should have an obligation to report, regardless of size. Any generating, load or transmission asset can set the pool price in any hour so all generators should have to report.</p> <p>Yes all other parties that can influence the market should provide information including known changes to transmission &amp; tie lines, import / export outages and any expectation of congestion in Alberta (including AESO's plans for say TMR). All this information should be posted by AESO in one place.</p>
<p><b>Question 3</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p>	<p><u><i>What entity should be responsible for submission of information, e.g. asset owner, affiliates or agents?</i></u></p> <p>The asset owners should be responsible for providing outage information to the AESO. This would require a change to the AESO rules. Such information provision should not supplant any other obligation of asset owners to disclose information to contracting parties, etc. In particular, this should not supplant the obligation of PPA Owners to disclose outage information to PPA Buyers in accordance with the PPA.</p> <p>Once there is a fully functional real-time system in place, PPA Owners should be responsible for submission of information. It is essential that PPA Owners' operational departments do not engage in preferential sharing of information with their respective trading departments before that information is public.</p>

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<p><b>Enmax</b></p> <p><b>TransAlta</b></p> <p><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, responsibility for the preparation, submission and accuracy of reported information should rest with the entity that has operational control of the asset. In most instances, the reporting entity would be expected to be the owner of the asset. In respect of a PPA generating unit, the reporting responsibility should rest with the PPA Owner rather than the PPA Buyer.</p> <p>Outage reporting should remain the obligation of the PPA Buyers, not PPA Owners. The proposed IDP attempts to amend the AESO's outage policy as it shifts the obligation for reporting outages from PPA Buyers, who have dispatch of the facility, to PPA Owners. This was a policy decision made by the AESO which was arrived at through a consultative process with participants. The MSA is now attempting to unilaterally change that collaborative decision and amend the AESO outage policy.</p> <p>The participant controlling the assets and has direct control of the outage should take responsibility for reporting the information. Much confusion can be created in the market if the plans are subject to frequent change so best to give reporting responsibility and this accountability to the party that has direct control.</p>
<p><b>Question 4</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p><b>Enmax</b></p> <p><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p><b><u>What outage related information should be submitted to the MSA?</u></b></p> <p>AltaGas supports the continued submission of information to the AESO and thence to the MSA, so long as the MSA maintains the information in confidence as required by the Market Surveillance Regulation.</p> <p>Outage information which includes, but may not necessarily be limited to, unit name, start date/ time; end date/ time; increase/ decrease on generating capacity or load consumption; type of outage (i.e. planned/maintenance/forced/ sudden forced); reason for outage; and reason for change in outage timing.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, the asset owner or entity designated to be responsible for reporting outages in respect of a specific asset should be required to provide all of the outage information outlined in Section 3.3.1 of the MSA's March 1 report. In addition, the designated reporting entity should be required to disclose when discussions leading to a decision to change an asset's availability commenced and should also be required to disclose the names of all individuals that were involved in or otherwise aware of any discussions leading to a change in the availability of an asset.</p> <p>The information contained in 3.3.1 in the MSA Report of March 1st should be reported. In addition if the outage plans</p>

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	change then as soon as the participant becomes aware notification should be given. This would include shutdowns in progress that are estimated to finish early or late. Any expected changes +/- 12 hours should be report immediately.
<b>Question 5</b>  <b>AltaGas</b>  <b>TransCanada</b>  <b>Enmax</b>  <b>Dow Chemical</b>	<p><b><u>What is the appropriate time frame for submitting outage information?</u></b></p> <p>AltaGas supports continuation of the time frames set out in the AESO’s OPP 601 for the IDP. AltaGas notes that the timeframes set out in the OPP require reporting of unscheduled outages and changes to information “as soon as possible” but then proceed to set an outside time limit for reporting.</p> <p>Sudden outage information should be submitted immediately. Longer term outage information should be submitted once a decision has been made concerning when an asset will be taken off line or when it will be returned to service. TransCanada is concerned that there be precision surrounding decisions to take assets off line and prompt submission of longer-term outage information. There may be scope for abuse by PPA Owners where trading occurs based on the high probability of an outage, but before disclosure of that outage actually occurs.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, notice of any change in the scheduling of a planned outage should be provided at least one (1) month prior to the revised planned outage date. Any forced outage should be provided to the AESO by the owner/reporting entity within no more than one (1) hour from either the time of the forced outage event or the time a decision is reached regarding a forced outage, whichever is earlier.</p> <p>The more immediate outages require more immediate reporting. The MSA should consult with participants to determine reasonable reporting times. The following examples illustrate a potential standard.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-An outage planned in the current week should be reported within the next hour.</li> <li>-An outage occurring in the current month should be reported within 1 business day.</li> <li>-Changes to long term outage schedules should be reported weekly or prior to any forward trades are conducted (whichever comes first).</li> </ul> <p>In many cases, the exact timing of the outage will not be known immediately but this should not be a problem in reporting the identified need for an outage. For instance, the problem of not knowing the exact outage timing can be overcome by including notation that lets participants know that the plan is subject to change / update (example; 7 day outage starting as early as June 15th and being complete by July 15th. This provides the market with enough information and also lets the Owner optimize their outage plan.</p>

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<p><b>Question 6</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p><b>Enmax</b></p> <p><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p><b><u>What is the reasonable level of obligation concerning the accuracy of outage information?</u></b></p> <p>So long as the information is coming from the asset owner, the information should be provided in accordance with the existing guidelines set out in the AESO’s OPP 601.</p> <p>It is essential that outage information be correct. The reasonable “level” of information is related to the issue of liability. If the MSA can confirm that market participants will not be held liable in respect of outage information or the MSA intends to underwrite such liability, then the level of disclosure may be a “best available outage” basis. If this is not the case, then a standard higher than “best available outage” is appropriate.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, the asset owner or other applicable outage reporting entity should be obligated to ensure that any decision to bring an asset out of service outside of a previously published maintenance schedule is based entirely operational requirements and not on economic or other considerations.</p> <p>The MSA should statistically review ... poor performers should be encouraged to improve. The MSA has power to investigate any suspect changes and request all market trading information carried out by the participant that is being investigated..</p>
<p><b>Question 7</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p><b>Enmax</b></p> <p><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p><b><u>What are reasonable alternatives concerning ways to improve the quality and certainty of outage information?</u></b></p> <p>The quality and certainty of outage information would be significantly improved by requiring the generation facility owners, including PPA Owners, rather than the PPA Buyers, submit outage information to the AESO. As a PPA Buyer, AltaGas has no control over outage planning and receives its outage information from the PPA Owner.</p> <p>The quality and certainty of outage information can be improved by removing incentives to mislead the market.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, the applicable outage reporting entity should be prepared to provide any applicable back up materials related to any of the information provided in respect of question 4 above.</p> <p>The MSA could request additional information from any participant that made a change to a scheduled outage to assess if the</p>

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	<p>shift was based on valid technical reasons or if it was to improve the participant's economic position. The MSA could impose sanctions (increased level of reporting for a period of time) or other take other measures to makes sure the participant has not gained as a result of a scheduling change.</p>
<p><b>Question 8</b></p> <p><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p><b>Enmax</b></p>	<p><b><u>What level of information publication would balance the rights and needs of individual asset owners and the rights and needs of the market at large with respect to the furtherance of a fair, efficient and openly competitive forward market?</u></b></p> <p>The information currently provided to the AESO and disclosed in an aggregated form is sufficient, so long as it is updated in accordance with the AESO's OPP 601. Current month and term trades should continue to be depicted differently. There is no point in publishing outage information in any more detail than can be used to trade standard instruments. For example, for term trades, starting in the prompt month and going forward, outage information should be aggregated over the entire month and published in a form equivalent to an average monthly availability.</p> <p>The appropriate test to achieve such a balance is a consideration of which participants have the ability to influence market prices (i.e. exercise market power). Market participants without such power should have the right to use proprietary information from their own assets including the freedom to replace supply loss and cover market shortfalls in the event of unplanned unit outages. PPA Buyers' ability to exercise market power was limited through the cap on PPA or derivatives ownership set out at Section 3 of the Power Purchase Arrangements Regulation (AR 167/2003). Furthermore, in the spirit of an "openly competitive forward market" the effect of the TPG and IDP should not be to make allowances for traders who do not undertake sufficient market research.</p> <p>The MSA's objectives would also be advanced by making sure that unfairness does not exist through operational departments sharing outage information with their respective trading departments before that information becomes public. Finally, to promote a balance, the MSA should ensure that during the lifetime of the Interim IDP and after it is no longer in effect, outage information shall not be disclosed on a unit basis or aggregated in such a manner that would have the effect of disclosing information on a unit basis.</p> <p>To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, ENMAX submits that outage information should continue to be publicized in graphical form. If possible, the number of MW's scheduled to be on outage during a particular period should be aggregated in order to minimize the extent to which market participants will be able to identify the specific system assets that are out of service at a given time. Similarly, when new assets go on outage, the number of MW's affected by a new development should be rounded to the nearest 10 MWs.</p>

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<b>TransAlta</b>	The outage information should be published in graphical aggregate form (as is currently done by the AESO) rather than by fuel type, and load information should also be made available in aggregate. This would allow a graph representing supply minus load to signal supply tightness in the market. This would also minimize the release of confidential unit specific information and reduce the opportunity for predatory pricing on parties who are experiencing unit outages. Aggregated information by fuel type makes it possible for parties to determine with certainty whose unit is experiencing an outage. Predatory pricing opportunities would also be created for the AESO's ancillary services procurement where other ancillary service providers know of specific hydro outages.
<b>Dow Chemical</b>	Aggregate MWs (rounded to nearest 10 MW) and show graphically by plant fuel source. An enhancement to this would be to also show the level of Reserves that are not available to the market as a result of the outages could also be shown.
<b>Question 9</b>	<b><u>What are the appropriate time periods for publishing outage information?</u></b>
<b>AltaGas</b>	The current time periods required by the AESO are adequate.
<b>TransCanada</b>	What is an appropriate time period is subject to how systems develop to support a real time schedule. Until that occurs, TransCanada submits that the "publishing" of outage information should be synonymous with such information being made "public". Under the TPG, information is deemed "public" once it is submitted to the AESO pursuant to the AESO Generating Outage Scheduling Coordination Procedure.
<b>Enmax</b>	To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, new information on outages should be publicized by the AESO within an hour of being received.
<b>TransAlta</b>	The outage duration estimate is also too uncertain and should be bounded. Outage timing and duration is inherently uncertain and that uncertainty increases the greater you look in the future. Posting outage information six months or a year in advance will give market participants the false perception of future supply/demand certainty and thereby create more conflict. Outage duration to be submitted would be better categorized as seven days or less, a month or less, a quarter or less and a year or less to account for uncertainty.
<b>Dow Chemical</b>	To build trust in forwards markets it is very important that the information is available with real time updates. As a participant updates the information, the target would be to have it available on-line to everyone immediately but in no cases should it take longer than one hour to be updated on web site.

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<p data-bbox="86 228 390 267"><b>Question 10</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 305 390 344"><b>Alta Gas</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 597 390 636"><b>TransCanada</b></p>	<p data-bbox="390 228 2011 267"><u><i>What performance indicators should be used by the MSA?</i></u></p> <p data-bbox="390 305 2011 560">As one of the aims of the Guideline is to increase liquidity in the market, the MSA should determine if liquidity in the market is increased to ascertain whether the program is successful. The performance measures or criteria will need to be clearly laid out and communicated to all stakeholders. Because the MSA has suggested that the results of the MSA’s evaluation will determine if the IDP is adjusted or removed, it is very important that clear performance measures are put in place so that the experiment can be discontinued if it is not bringing about desired results. In the experimental time period of this TPG, the MSA is exposing existing market participants, especially PPA Buyers, to unacceptable risk when attempting to cover hedge positions.</p> <p data-bbox="390 597 2011 738">The performance indicators set out at section Section 4.1 of the IDP may be appropriate, but require further clarity. The terms “liquidity”, “forward market”, “efficiency” and “confidence” should be more specifically defined. Further details about what increases in participants, transaction volume and breadth/ depth of the market the MSA is seeking would also be beneficial</p>
<p data-bbox="86 776 390 815"><b>Question 11</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 852 390 891"><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 966 390 1005"><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 1112 390 1151"><b>Enmax</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 1291 390 1330"><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p data-bbox="390 776 2011 815"><u><i>In the long-term, what is the appropriate entity for publishing outage information, e.g. AESO, MSA or other agency?</i></u></p> <p data-bbox="390 852 2011 891">The information should be published by the AESO, as is the current practice.</p> <p data-bbox="390 966 2011 1075">The AESO is probably best equipped from an information technology (“IT”) and computer systems perspective to be the publishing entity. The key issues for TransCanada are the efficiency, reliability and integrity of the publishing entity’s computer system and IT capability.</p> <p data-bbox="390 1112 2011 1253">To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, outage information should be reported to the AESO as soon as possible so that the impact of any disruption may be assessed by system control centre personnel. However, AESO system control centre staff should not provide information to other AESO staff (including in particular any AESO staff responsible for ancillary services procurement) prior to the general release of information to all market participants.</p> <p data-bbox="390 1291 2011 1330">It should be published on the AESO web site.</p>

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<p data-bbox="86 228 390 266"><b>Question 12</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 380 390 417"><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 563 390 600"><b>TransCanada</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 779 390 816"><b>Enmax</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 995 390 1032"><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p data-bbox="390 228 2013 342"><u><b>Suggestions for coordination of the outage information requirement for System Control, AESO Outage Coordination and the MSA? What is the point at which information about should be submitted? For example, at what point is a bona fide decision made with respect to scheduling an outage?</b></u></p> <p data-bbox="390 380 2013 521">Only the PPA Owners, other generation facility owners and load entities know at what point a <i>bona fide</i> decision is made about a scheduled outage. For this reason, it is the generation owners or load entities that should be required to submit outage information under OPP 601. Regarding coordination and timing of information sharing, the AESO OPP rules should be administered.</p> <p data-bbox="390 563 2013 743">With respect to short term (i.e. within a current month) unplanned outages, a bona fide decision is made on scheduling an outage when any communication about any probability of an outage is communicated beyond the direct operations group ultimately responsible for the timing and/or planning of the outage. With respect to longer term planned outages, a bona fide decision occurs when a tentative decision (i.e. a tentative planned outage date) has been made by the operations group and the plan is communicated beyond the operations group.</p> <p data-bbox="390 779 2013 959">To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, the “clock” related to an outage that must be reported by the asset owner or other applicable outage reporting entity should start from the point in time that a definitive decision is made to take the asset out of service. Pursuant to the response to question 4 above, the reporting entity should be required to disclose in any report when the discussions regarding an outage commenced and which individuals were involved in an outage decision or otherwise informed that an outage was under consideration.</p> <p data-bbox="390 995 2013 1073">As soon as the participant becomes aware of the outage or change to an already scheduled outage should start the clock. And as in answer to Question 5 above, the participant then needs to communicate this information.</p>
<p data-bbox="86 1109 390 1146"><b>Question 13</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 1187 390 1224"><b>AltaGas</b></p> <p data-bbox="86 1330 390 1367"><b>TransCanada</b></p>	<p data-bbox="390 1109 2013 1154"><u><b>Should market participants designate a Compliance Officer and file compliance plans with the MSA?</b></u></p> <p data-bbox="390 1187 2013 1292">If the MSA institutes a code of conduct as between generation owners and their trading affiliates, then designating a Compliance officer and requiring filing of compliance plans with the MSA would be sensible. In the absence of such a code of conduct, such a requirement would be unnecessary bureaucracy.</p> <p data-bbox="390 1330 2013 1398">No. Compliance under the TPG and IDP can be successfully executed without a designated compliance officer or compliance plans.</p>

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<p data-bbox="92 305 197 334"><b>Enmax</b></p> <p data-bbox="92 412 296 441"><b>Dow Chemical</b></p>	<p data-bbox="401 305 1986 375">To the extent that the MSA maintains the new TPG, any entity that controls assets that would need to be reported under this policy should designate an individual responsible for ensuring that appropriate reporting occurs.</p> <p data-bbox="401 412 1986 482">Since outages can occur 7 X 24 it is not practical to have a particular person designated to report the information. However, it is not unreasonable to require each participant to name an individual so that the MSA can follow-up with questions.</p>
<p data-bbox="92 565 239 594"><b>TransAlta</b></p>	<p data-bbox="401 565 846 594"><b><u>What is the trigger for reporting?</u></b></p> <p data-bbox="401 638 2003 813">When does the MSA consider a “decision” to have been made concerning when an outage will begin or end? What documentation does the MSA contemplate requesting? The MSA states in its “FAQs” that “information about an outage schedule should be submitted once a decision has been made concerning when the asset will be taken off line or when it will be returned to service. The MSA expects that market participants will maintain appropriate documentation of their decisions.” This is not instructive.</p>
<p data-bbox="92 935 205 964"><b>Calpine</b></p> <p data-bbox="92 1078 205 1107"><b>Calpine</b></p> <p data-bbox="92 1188 205 1218"><b>Calpine</b></p>	<p data-bbox="401 935 1493 964"><b><u>What constitutes “an asset that has the ability to materially affect forward prices”?</u></b></p> <p data-bbox="401 1078 1633 1107"><b><u>How does the MSA determine that an asset has the ability to materially affect forward prices?</u></b></p> <p data-bbox="401 1188 1944 1253"><b><u>How will a participant or asset that is deemed not to have the ability to materially affect forward prices be told of, and ensured of, that status?</u></b></p>